ae: blank out ld-linux.so interpretor path from AEs#435
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berrange wants to merge 1 commit intointel:mainfrom
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ae: blank out ld-linux.so interpretor path from AEs#435berrange wants to merge 1 commit intointel:mainfrom
berrange wants to merge 1 commit intointel:mainfrom
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fchinchilla
reviewed
Oct 9, 2024
| -Wl,--build-id \ | ||
| -Wl,--version-script=Enclave/linux/qve.lds | ||
| -Wl,--version-script=Enclave/linux/qve.lds \ | ||
| -Wl,--dynamic-linker, |
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Just curious, is this equivalent, or different in any way from
-Wl,--no-dynamic-linker
?
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They are different
- "-Wl,--dynamic-linker," results in an ELF '.interp' section being present, with zero-length string.
- "-Wl,--no-dynamic-linker" results in the ELF '.interp' section being entirely absent, and in addition removes the ELF program header
It is possible this difference might not matter, but I don't know enough to be confident suggesting that - similar to how "-Wl,--shared" might another option. It would need an SGX expert to analyse this and make a decision.
fchinchilla
approved these changes
Oct 11, 2024
The enclaves are getting built as ELF executables, and thus the linker
will embed the current ld-linux.so path for the host OS environment
in the binary:
$ readelf -a libsgx_tdqe.signed.so | grep interpreter
[Requesting program interpreter: /nix/store/xmprbk52mlcdsljz66m8yf7cf0xf36n1-glibc-2.38-44/lib/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2]
The SGX enclaves are never loaded using ld-linux.so, as SGX has custom
code for loading enclaves in the required manner.
This embedded ld-linux.so path thus serves no functional purpose, while
also making it harder to do a reproducible build of the enclaves outside
of the NixOS environment.
This patch blanks out the NixOX interpretor path, by setting it to the
empty string.
Related: intel/confidential-computing.sgx#1040
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
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The enclaves are getting built as ELF executables, and thus the linker will embed the current ld-linux.so path for the host OS environment in the binary:
$ readelf -a libsgx_tdqe.signed.so | grep interpreter
[Requesting program interpreter: /nix/store/xmprbk52mlcdsljz66m8yf7cf0xf36n1-glibc-2.38-44/lib/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2]
The SGX enclaves are never loaded using ld-linux.so, as SGX has custom code for loading enclaves in the required manner.
This embedded ld-linux.so path thus serves no functional purpose, while also making it harder to do a reproducible build of the enclaves outside of the NixOS environment.
This patch blanks out the NixOX interpretor path, by setting it to the empty string.
Related: intel/confidential-computing.sgx#1040
This is the DCAP counterpart to this SGX PR: intel/confidential-computing.sgx#1061